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1. Introduction
In mid-June, just two weeks after the Constitutional Treaty
was rejected by two founding Member States, EU leaders
failed to reach agreement on the financing of the Union –
the so-called Financial Perspective – for 2007-2013. This
failure deepened the sense of crisis in the EU.1 Money
matters in the EU.
In this article we review the budget of the Union, its size,
sources of revenue, areas of expenditure and consider,
first, how it may be reformed so that it can serve better the
objectives of the Union and, second, how Member States
can share more fairly the burden of financing it.
Albeit small – just 1% of EU GNP – the budget is given
particular importance by the Member States. Therefore, we
examine the merits of the view that some Member States get
a "raw deal" from EU expenditure.
Some of the options for budgetary reform we explore
here are unlikely to be adopted. In fact, the Commissioner
responsible for the budget, Dalia Grybauskaite, is reported
to believe that extensive reform cannot be achieved any
more because there is simply not enough time before the
current Financial Perspective expires.2  Our task is not to try
to predict the outcome of the on going budgetary negotia-
tions. Instead we offer some tentative answers to two
supposedly simple questions, namely what and how? What
policies should the EU finance and how should it finance
them.
The following section puts things in perspective. It
reviews the budget in terms of its aims, evolution and
structure of revenue and expenditure. This is followed by an
analysis of net budgetary balances showing the financial
burden-sharing among the Member States. The fourth
section considers which policies the EU should fund. Section
five evaluates the Commission proposal for the Financial
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Perspective 2007-2013. In the last section, we outline our
own ideas on how the EU budget can be reformed so that
expenditure becomes more efficient and equitable.
Please note that due to space restrictions, the paper
version of Eipascope does not contain all the relevant
budgetary statistics. They are annexed to the internet
version of Eipascope which can be accessed at www.eipa.nl.
2. Evolution and structure of the EU Budget
Apart from the fact that the EU budget is determined by EU
institutions, it differs from national budgets in two funda-
mental respects.3  First, it is very small – around 1% of EU
GNP – compared to total public expenditure in all Member
States of around 50% of EU GNP. It is also legally prevented
from exceeding 1.27% of the EU GNP. Second, the EU
budget is legally required to be in balance each year.
Unlike its members, the EU cannot run deficits. The budget,
therefore, cannot be used to affect in any significant way
overall economic activity in the EU – a normal task of
national budgets.
The budget has grown from an amount equivalent to
€ 7.3 million in 1958, which was denominated in Belgian
francs and was used exclusively for administrative expenses,
to € 100.1 billion in 2004.4
Typically, the budget during its first 30 years followed
the development of the common agricultural policy. Starting
in 1988, structural funds and internal policies such as R&D
and, from 1993, external aid have gained importance.
While its absolute size has grown and will continue to do
so, in relative terms, a peak was reached in 1993 with
spending at 1.18% of EU GNP. Contrary to public opinion,
relative expenditure has in fact decreased since then. It now
stands at 0.98% of EU GNP.5
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This article reviews the budget of the Union, its size, sources of revenue, areas of
expenditure and considers, first, how it may be reformed so that it can serve better
the objectives of the Union and, second, how Member States can share more fairly
the burden of financing it. The article argues that agricultural spending should be
reduced, structural funds should be more concentrated and that any mechanism to
correct budgetary imbalances should also take into account excessive surpluses as
well as excessive deficits.
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2.1. The revenue side
The EU budget is financed by the so-called "Own Resources".
There are four income sources that cannot exceed 1.24%
of EU GNI6 (or 1.27% of GNP), which is the ceiling agreed
by the European Council in Berlin in March 1999.
The first two sources of revenue – agricultural levies and
customs duties are known as the "Traditional Own Resources"
(TOR) of the EU. The TOR reflect the financial autonomy of
the EU because they are regarded as resources that belong
to the EU and are levied directly on economic agents. The
VAT and GNI-based resources are financial contributions
from the Member States' national treasuries to the EU.
However, all payments into the EU budget are classified as
"Own Resources of the EU".
2.2. The expenditure side
As shown in Table 2, the budget is divided in six main areas.
The common agricultural policy (CAP) and the structural
funds are the main spending priorities. Together they make
up around 75% of the total budget, with the CAP being the
largest at more than 45%. Their share in appropriations for
commitments is even larger, reaching 80% of the total
budget.
3. Budgetary imbalances
When the EU budget attracts public attention it is mostly for
negative reasons: mismanagement and outright fraud.
More recently, however, the issue of juste retour has entered
public discourse. Politicians have been asking who pays for
the EU and who benefits from EU spending? These are
deceptively simple questions which, as explained below,
cannot be given simple answers.
In the EU15, more than 50% of total CAP expenditure is
absorbed by only three counties: France (24%), Spain
(15%) and Germany (13%). Spending from structural funds
is equally concentrated (as it should be): Spain, Italy and
Germany take more than 50%. Spain alone accounts for a
staggering 32%. As we explain later on, structural funds
should be focused. But we will also question whether it
makes sense to allocate such high shares to countries with
incomes above the EU average.
With respect to the revenue, more than half comes from
contributions from three countries alone: Germany (23%),
France (18%) and Italy (14%).
The receipts of the Member States do not normally
match their contributions to the budget. This creates deficits
and surpluses or "imbalances". Germany is the largest
contributor and Spain is the largest recipient in absolute
terms. Indeed for many years, countries like Germany, The
Netherlands and the UK have been net payers and countries
like Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland have been net
recipient.
The picture is slightly different when imbalances are
expressed in per capita terms. Per capita positions are
better indicators of the real effects of budgetary flows since
they relate to the burden borne or gain obtained by each
person. In per capita terms the Benelux is the highest net
contributor, with Germany only in fifth place (This ranking
excludes administrative expenditure by EU institutions. If it
is included in the receipts of Member States, then the
receipts of Luxembourg and Belgium increase considerably
and Luxembourg becomes the largest net beneficiary per
capita). Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain are the highest
net recipients respectively. Ireland is an aberration here
because it has grown to become the second most prosperous
Member State in the EU25. We return later on to the Irish
case because it reveals more starkly the problem of funding
poor regions in rich countries.
3.1. The UK rebate
The UK has always had a considerable negative budgetary
balance. This has been largely caused by two factors. First,
on the spending side, the predominance of the CAP
coupled with the relatively small size of the agricultural
sector in the UK economy has meant that the UK obtains a
relatively smaller proportion of EU expenditure. Second, on
the revenue side, the UK's extensive trade links with the
Commonwealth and North America have resulted in a
larger amount of tariff revenue contributed to the EU
budget.
In 1984, the then British Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, succeeded in getting her "money back" by securing
an "abatement" or "rebate". On the basis of a complicated
formula, each year the EU returns to the UK a certain
amount of money. This corresponds to € 4.5 billion this year
or 66% of what its net balance would otherwise be. All
remaining 24 Member States contribute to this rebate –
even the poorest of them. What is less well known is that
since 2000, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands and
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T T T T Table 1: Sources of revenue, 2005 able 1: Sources of revenue, 2005 able 1: Sources of revenue, 2005 able 1: Sources of revenue, 2005 able 1: Sources of revenue, 2005
Type of revenue million € %
1. Agricultural duties
and sugar levies 1,613.0 1.5
2. Customs duties 10,749.9 10.1
3. VAT 15,313.5 14.4
4. GNI-based 77,583.1 73.0
Total (including surplus) 106,300.0 100.0
Source: European Commission7
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T T T T Table 2: Expenditure, 2005 able 2: Expenditure, 2005 able 2: Expenditure, 2005 able 2: Expenditure, 2005 able 2: Expenditure, 2005
(appropriations for payments)
Policy area million € %
Agriculture 49,115 46.23
Structural funds 32,396 30.49
Internal policies 7,924 7.46
External policies 5,476 5.15
Administration 6,293 5.92
Pre-accession aid 3,287 3.09
Total (with reserves) 106,241 100.00
Source: European Commission8E
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Sweden, because they too protested that they paid too
much into the budget, contribute only a quarter of what they
would otherwise bear for the UK abatement.
In section 6 we consider whether the UK, which is now
one of the richest countries in the EU, should be subsidised
by other Member States, some of which have per capita
income as low as 40% of that of the UK (see Table 3).
3.2. Do net balances represent the net costs
and benefits of EU membership?
The answer is no.9  The derivation of net balances depends
on what is included on the revenue and expenditure sides
of the budget. The Commission, for example, does not
include tariff revenue because it regards it as belonging to
the EU. Indeed, had the
EU not existed, some
countries, notably The
Netherlands, would not
collect tariff revenue on
goods offloaded in Rotter-
dam and destined, for
example, for Germany or
Denmark. These goods
would have been in transit
and tariffs would have
been levied by the country
of the final destination.
More fundamentally
and aside from the problem of how to measure budgetary
balances, these balances fail to capture to any significant
degree the economic, let alone the political, benefits or
costs of EU membership. Net balances cannot measure the
effects of EU policies, increased trade, investment and
regulatory harmonisation. It is also difficult to identify the
ultimate beneficiaries of EU expenditure (e.g. research
funds obtained by multinational consortia). It is said that
40% of capital investment supported by structural funds in
cohesion countries eventually flows back to the main capital
manufacturing countries which happen to be the net
contributing Member States.
4. What should the EU support
through its budget?
Public finance attributes three "classical" functions to public
spending and budgets: allocation, (re)distribution and
stabilisation.10  We examine whether similar functions can
be performed by the EU budget.
The allocation function of public finance involves the
supply of public goods. A public good is different from a
private good in that it cannot be provided through the free
market because consumption by non-payers cannot be
prevented. Due to this market failure, a political process is
necessary for the supply of public goods (e.g. policing,
defence, education, parks, clean air). In the context of the
EU, collaborative R&D and environmental protection are
examples of trans-national public goods that should be
funded through the EU budget.11  In addition, there are
goods which are not strictly public but which cannot be
achieved by any individual country such as strong bargaining
in the WTO or with the US. We call these cooperative goods.
Lastly, in this allocative function we would also include
funding for EU institutions that ensure the EU system
operates properly and EU rules are applied effectively.
The (re)distributive function of the public budget aims to
create equity in the structure of national income and wealth.
The extent of redistribution is a political choice. The EU
budget plays a significant role in redistributing income
among its Member States through structural and cohesion
policies. As long as the EU Treaty retains such policy
objectives, we regard their funding through the EU budget
as unavoidable. But, even if these policy objectives were not
in the Treaty, some redistribution would still make sense for
the following reason. The prosperous countries are more
likely to gain from EU membership through trade and
investment. Therefore, it is in the interest of those countries
to ensure that poorer Member States also support integration
because they can also gain from cohesion policies which in
this context can be seen as the necessary "side payments"
to facilitate integration.
The recently established
solidarity fund can also
be included here.
The stabilisation func-
tion of public finance
smoothes out the inter-
temporal, inter-sectoral
and inter-regional impact
of asymmetric shocks in
the economy. It involves
the use of fiscal policy –
spending and taxes – as a
means of maintaining
high employment and a high rate of economic growth. But,
as long as the EU budget remains small – its current ceiling
is 1.24% of EU GNI – it will have virtually no stabilising
power.
It follows that on the basis of public finance theory, in
addition to outlays of Community institutions, the EU
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T T T T Table 3: R able 3: R able 3: R able 3: R able 3: Relative prosperity of Member States, 2004 elative prosperity of Member States, 2004 elative prosperity of Member States, 2004 elative prosperity of Member States, 2004 elative prosperity of Member States, 2004
Per capita income as % of EU average
LU 245.7 CY 89.6
IE 133.1 EL 88.3
AT 127.6 SI 83.2
DK 126.6 PT 77.2
UK 126.2 MT 75.1
BE 125.8 CZ 73.8
NL 125.3 HU 62.7
SE 119.5 SK 57.7
FI 118.6 EE 52.9
FR 117.7 PL 50.7
DE 112.2 LT 50.6
IT 111.8 LV 47.6
ES 100.6 EU25 100.0
Source: Eurostat
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capture to any significant
degree the economic,
let alone the political,
benefits or costs
of EU membership.
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budget should primarily finance trans-national public goods,
cooperative goods and cohesion/solidarity instruments. As
we have put it elsewhere, "the Union should support those
policies or finance those actions that make it more cohesive,
more competitive and give it a more effective voice in the
world."12  In their wide-ranging report on the future of the
EU, Sapir et al. reach similar conclusions.13  They support
reform of the budget so that it funds economic growth
(primarily research), convergence (primarily structural ac-
tions) and restructuring (primarily for industrial adjustment).
It is obvious that we have left out the CAP which accounts
for almost 45% of EU spending. This is because agriculture
is a declining sector representing no more than 3% of the
EU economy and no more than 5% of EU labour force, even
after enlargement. The CAP is an interventionist policy that
distorts both domestic production and trade, although to a
lesser degree now after a decade of reform. The important
point to note here is that as the EU shifts away from
production subsidies, trade restrictions and export subsidies
and towards direct income support, there is less and less
justification for funding through the EU budget. While
production subsidies and trade restrictions require cen-
tralised management of prices and trade flows and thus EU
intervention, direct income support can be delivered by
each Member State without affecting farmers in other
countries. There is no need for EU intervention.
Sapir et al. have called the EU budget an historical relic.
They argue that "expenditures, revenues and procedures
are all inconsistent with the present and future state of EU
integration." We agree with them.
5. An appraisal of the Commission proposal
for the next financial perspective
The Commission proposal for the FP 2007-2013 aspires to
create a budgetary basis that can accommodate the present
and future challenges facing the EU primarily due to
enlargement and the Lisbon strategy. It also tries to take on
board some of the recommendations in the Sapir report.
The FP 2007-2013, totalling € 1000 billion, is arranged
in the following categories of expenditure [in brackets are
the amounts per heading for the seven-year period]14:
• Heading 1: Sustainable growth Sustainable growth Sustainable growth Sustainable growth Sustainable growth [ € 471 billion] is
subdivided into:
Competitiveness for growth and employment, this
includes expenditure on R&D and innovation, education
and training, trans-European networks, the internal
market and associated policies [€ 133 billion].
Cohesion for growth and employment, to promote
convergence of the less developed Member States and
regions, and to support territorial cooperation [€ 339
billion].
• Heading 2: Preservation and management of natural Preservation and management of natural Preservation and management of natural Preservation and management of natural Preservation and management of natural
resources resources resources resources resources, which encompass the common agricultural
and fisheries policies, rural development and environ-
mental measures [€ 405 billion of which € 301 billion for
agriculture].
• Heading 3: Citizenship, freedom, security and justice Citizenship, freedom, security and justice Citizenship, freedom, security and justice Citizenship, freedom, security and justice Citizenship, freedom, security and justice,
is a heading for several new policies, mainly justice and
home affairs, border protection, immigration and asylum
policy, public health and consumer protection, culture,
youth, information and dialogue with citizens. It also
covers the EU's solidarity and rapid reaction fund [€ 25
billion].
• Heading 4: The European Union as a global partner The European Union as a global partner The European Union as a global partner The European Union as a global partner The European Union as a global partner,
this covers external action, including pre-accession aid,
the European Development Fund (EDF) which will be
integrated into the budget, and emergency aid and loan
guarantees [€ 95 billion].
• Heading 5: Administration Administration Administration Administration Administration, this covers institutional
costs like salaries, pensions etc. [€ 29 billion].
Despite the rhetoric on the need to reduce expenditure on
agriculture, the EU still intends to allocate more than 40%
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T T T T Table 4: Estimated net budgetary balances able 4: Estimated net budgetary balances able 4: Estimated net budgetary balances able 4: Estimated net budgetary balances able 4: Estimated net budgetary balances
(average 2008-2013) as % of GNI (average 2008-2013) as % of GNI (average 2008-2013) as % of GNI (average 2008-2013) as % of GNI (average 2008-2013) as % of GNI
BE  1.21% 1.26%
CZ 3.17% 3.20%
DK -0.31% -0.26%
DE -0.54% -0.48%
EE 3.76% 3.79%
EL 2.16% 2.19%
ES 0.23% 0.26%
FR -0.37% -0.33%
IE 0.47% 0.51%
IT -0.41% -0.35%
CY -0.37% -0.33%
LV 4.40% 4.45%
LT 4.41% 4.44%
LU 5.80% 5.83%
HU 3.06% 3.09%
MT 1.06% 1.10%
NL -0.56% -0.48%
AT -0.38% -0.41%
PL 3.76% 3.79%
PT 1.50% 1.54%
SI 1.31% 1.34%
SK 3.27% 3.30%
FI -0.25% -0.20%
SE -0.50% -0.45%
UK -0.25% -0.51%
Source: European Commission15
Estimated net
budgetary
balances
as % of GNI
Current
UK correction
GCM
with 0.35%
threshold
& cap at
€ 7.5 billionE
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T T T T Table 5: Example of modulation of national contributions according to relative capacity to pay able 5: Example of modulation of national contributions according to relative capacity to pay able 5: Example of modulation of national contributions according to relative capacity to pay able 5: Example of modulation of national contributions according to relative capacity to pay able 5: Example of modulation of national contributions according to relative capacity to pay
Country A Country B Country C Union
Population (% of total) 50 million 20 million 1 million 71 million
(70%) (28%) (1.4%)
GNI (% of total) 1250 billion 300 billion 35 billion 1585 billion
(79%) (19%) (2.3%)
GNI/capita 25,000 15,000 35,000 22,324
Budget: 1.2% of Union GNI 19 billion =
268/person
Equal contributions 13.4 billion 5.4 billion 0.27 billion
at 268/person 71% 28% 1.4%
Contributions according 15.01 billion 3.61 billion 0.44 billion
to share in Union GNI 79% 19% 2.3%
of its budget to farming
and rural development.
The scheduled accession
of agriculturally more
intensive countries such as
Romania, where 40% of
labour is employed in
agriculture, will make
future reform of the CAP
an even more intractable
problem. Perhaps the
Commission decided that
it is politically expedient
to retain agricultural spen-
ding largely at current
levels after it has seen that
Eurosceptic farmers in
central and eastern
Europe have become
markedly more pro-EU
after they started receiving
money from Brussels.
In terms of the overall
size of the budget, the Commission proposed that the
current ceiling of 1.24% of EU GNI is retained. This is
contrary to the demands by the five largest net contributing
countries, lead by The Netherlands, that want expenditure
capped at 1% of EU GNI.
The Commission also retains the current ceiling of 4%
GNI of the recipient countries for structural support. This
means that the poorest Member States will get less money
per capita than more prosperous states of similar population
size. This ceiling has been defended on the grounds that
higher allocations of Community money cannot be easily
absorbed by the recipients as they have to be matched with
national money. However, we do not see any serious
reason why the ratio of national contributions cannot be
lowered so that the per capita receipts of beneficiary
countries can be increased. Alternatively, the required
national co-financing ratio can be proportional to the per
capita income of the recipient country so that the richer
counties contribute more.
The old Member States will still absorb about 50% of all
structural funds. In fact,
some of the old Member
States will continue re-
ceiving structural funds by
virtue of the fact that they
receive them in the current
FP. This is despite the fact
that they have reached
very high levels of pros-
perity, most strikingly in
the case of Ireland. This is
contrary to the objective
of concentrating Commu-
nity aid where it is most
needed. By contrast,
Cyprus with 30% less per
capita income than
Ireland will be receiving
much less money simply
because today it is not
eligible for assistance as
"Objective 1" region.
On the revenue side –
and in response to the widespread critique of the UK rebate
– the Commission proposes a generalised correction mecha-
nism of budgetary imbalances. This mechanism seeks to
compensate each Member State that experiences negative
net balances above a certain threshold.
Even after the introduction of this corrective mechanism,
the old Member States are mostly net contributors and all
new Member States with the exception of Cyprus are net
recipients. This is broadly in line with the cohesion goal of the
EU. However, the corrective mechanism does not eliminate
some awkward disparities between Member States. As can
be seen in Table 4, Cyprus will have a deficit that is expected
to reach 0.37% of its GNI. The Commission formula will
reduce the Cypriot deficit to about 0.33% of its GNI. By
contrast, Denmark which is almost 50% richer than Cyprus
on a per capita basis will have a deficit of 0.26% of GNI.
These anomalies are the result of the choice of policies
on which the EU spends money. Curbing excessive budgetary
burden is important, but a move towards a system where
everyone gets back the same as they put in (recycling funds
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Curbing excessive budgetary
burden is important, but a
move towards a system where
everyone gets back the same
as they put in (recycling funds
via Brussels) is pointless.
Financial redistribution
through the EU budget only
makes economic sense if it
aims to foster economic and
social cohesion and efficient
allocation of public goods.E
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via Brussels) is pointless. Financial redistribution through
the EU budget only makes economic sense if it aims to foster
economic and social cohesion and efficient allocation of
public goods.
6. How should the budgetary burden and
receipts be shared in an enlarged EU?
In section 4 we saw that public finance theory attributes
certain roles to public budgets, only two of which appear to
fit the EU. These are the allocative and redistributive roles.
In this section we examine how Member States should share
the budgetary burden or how their contributions should be
determined and how EU spending should be divided
among them. Our own thinking and therefore our proposals
are based on the premise that contributions and cohesion-
based receipts should be determined according to the
national capacity to pay and national need, respectively,
both of which are indicated by per capita income.16
6.1. The revenue side of the budget
or national contributions
Not much can be changed
on the revenue side of the
budget because national
contributions are broadly
equitable. This is due to
the large and rising share
(70%) of the GNI-based
payments. However, the
remaining 30% should
also be taken into account
so that the overall amount
should be directly linked
to each country's pros-
perity.
At present the Com-
mission excludes tariff revenue from the calculations of
national deficits (or surpluses) because it regards it as
belonging to the EU. This is broadly right for Belgium and
The Netherlands which have two of the largest ports in
Europe and which would not have collected as much tariff
revenue in the absence of the EU. However, for other
Member States and especially the new ones, tariffs are a
significant source of public revenue which is now being
turned over to the EU solely because they have become EU
members.
The whole of the contributions of Member States should
be determined according to relative capacity to pay. An
example of a union with three hypothetical Member States
is shown in Table 5 to clarify how contributions vary when
they are shared equally and when they are shared according
to the size of the economy which is equivalent to the relative
wealth of each country or its capacity to pay.
6.2. The expenditure side of the budget
or national receipts
Determining a formula for contributions is rather easy. The
real problem is on the expenditure side precisely because
national deficits or surpluses are caused by the Community
spending pattern which in turn has very different impact on
the various Member States.
A budget based on the principle of national need (which
corresponds to the principle of capacity to pay on the expenditure
side) would be reformed as follows.
First, cohesion receipts should be proportional to national
income. At present, all Member States draw on Community
structural funds because eligibility (for Objectives 1 and 2)
is determined according to regional income. All Member
States have regions that are relatively poor – even
Luxembourg with per capita income over 200% of EU
average.
However, a poor region in a rich country is not in a
similar situation as a poor region in a poor country. There
is much more capacity for regional redistribution within rich
countries rather than poor countries. Therefore, it does
make sense to restrict eligibility for regional aid to regions
situated in Member States with per capita income less than
the EU average or some other cut-off point. Politically, this
will not be easy to achieve because some countries such as
Spain, whose relative income has reached virtually 100% of
the EU average, is the largest recipient of EU structural
funds. But, there is not much logic to the current proposal
for the 2007-2013 period, that still envisages 50% of
structural funds going to the old Member States which, with
the exception of Greece
and Portugal, have per
capita incomes above the
EU average.
Second, a large part of
the CAP should be re-
nationalized. In fact, all
agricultural spending that
goes to direct income
support need not be
recycled through Brussels.
That would reduce by 60-
70% current CAP spen-
ding. Member States
should be free to deter-
mine how much they want
to boost the income of their farmers. There is no need for
collective EU decisions on this issue. Nor will national
income supplements create any negative externalities that
can harm other countries (provided, of course, that such
supplements are truly de-coupled from production). In fact,
the present system of direct income support perpetuates a
gross inequality as the amount that is paid to farmers is
linked to the amount of production subsidies they used to
receive under the old regime of market support. It is a
mistake to believe that EU funding brings about equality of
support of farmers across Europe.
6.3. And the correction mechanism for
excessive net contributions?
The rebate for the UK has been justified on the grounds that
its economy is different from that of the "typical" Member
State. But on reflection, the reasons cited in section 3.1 why
the rebate was introduced are feeble. Why should it matter
that a Member State imports too much from third countries
or that it has a relatively small farming sector? The EC
Treaty, for example, does not attribute any particular
importance to the source of imports or the size of the
farming sector. The net financial position of each country is
the natural outcome of the collective policy choices. It is
unavoidable that some countries gain more than others.
A generalised correction mechanism can be justified in
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The net financial position
of each country is the
natural outcome of the
collective policy choices.
It is unavoidable that
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the present context
because EU spending
is not efficient. It sup-
ports policies, such as
the CAP, for which it
cannot be credibly ar-
gued that EU funding is
necessary to support the
production of some
European public good.
But, once this kind of
inefficiency is removed
from the budget, a cor-
rection mechanism is no
longer needed.
There is also another problem with any automatic
correction mechanism. If it is unfair for any country to
experience excessive deficit (however that may be defined),
why is it not unfair for any country to experience excessive
surplus? No one has so far considered whether there
should also be a corresponding ceiling on net surpluses. At
present there is only a ceiling with respect to structural funds
and that is because of the difficulty of Member States to
provide matching funds. The essence of fairness is its
symmetric nature. If the EU wants to intervene to adjust the
results of its own policy decisions, as far as deficits are
concerned, then it should intervene to correct surpluses. But
such intervention generates some surprising results.
Table 6 depicts the effects of a generalised correction
mechanism for our three-country union. Our calculations
are based on a double ceiling which is 0.35% of GNI for
deficits and 1% of GNI for surpluses. The results demonstrate
that such ceilings necessarily imply either an increase in the
receipts of the net contributing country (shown as option I
in the Table) or a limit on the overall amount of the union
budget together with a decrease in the contributions of that
T T T T Table 6: Modulation of net balances with a generalised correction mechanism able 6: Modulation of net balances with a generalised correction mechanism able 6: Modulation of net balances with a generalised correction mechanism able 6: Modulation of net balances with a generalised correction mechanism able 6: Modulation of net balances with a generalised correction mechanism
Country A Country B Country C
Contributions 15.01 billion 3.61 billion 0.44 billion
(according to share of GNI)
Assumed receipts without 10 billion 8 billion 1 billion
correction (% of budget) (53%) (42%) (5%)
Net balance -5.01 billion +4.39 billion +0.56 billion
(% of own GNI) (-0.4%) (+1.5%) (+1.6%)
Correction thresholds as % of own GNI: -4.38 billion +3.0 billion +0.35 billion
deficit = 0.35; surplus = 1.0
Correction needed +0.63 billion -1.39 billion -0.21 billion
Method of correction
Option I: Increase receipts
keeping budget at 19 bn
Corrected receipts 11.6 billion 6.61 billion 0.79 billion
Corrected deficit/surplus -3.41 (0.273%) +3.00 (1%) +0.35 (1%)
Option II: Receipts at max ceilings
(budget falls to 17.4 bn)
Corrected receipts 10 billion 6.61 billion 0.79 billion
Corrected contributions 13.35 billion 3.61 billion 0.44 billion
Corrected deficit/surplus -3.35 (0.268%) +3.0 (1%) +0.35 (1%)
As long as CAP spending
is maintained at present
levels, there is little
hope that the budget
will actually serve as a
stimulant for growth
and cohesion.
country (shown as option II
in the Table).
The usefulness of these
calculations is that they de-
monstrate the consequences
of any far-reaching reform
of budgetary arrangements
in the EU. The introduction
of any generalized correc-
tion mechanism cannot work
if EU expenditure is auto-
matic or pre-fixed across all
members. But this is precisely
how CAP spending is cur-
rently determined. All far-
mers are automatically entitled to support from the EU
budget. Member States only determine the overall budget
and the level of support for each agricultural product, unit
of land or head of animal. Once these amounts are set,
then any farmer in any Member State is eligible to receive
funding. It is clear that such automaticity is contrary to the
logic of budgetary adjustments according to the paying
capacity or need of Member States. It follows, therefore,
that the CAP rules, not just the politics associated with it, are
the biggest obstacle to budgetary reform.
7. Conclusions
In this article we examine the budget of the EU and consider
how it can be reformed so that the Union can add more value
at the European level as it enlarges further.
Our main criticism of the current budgetary arrangements
and the FP 2007-2013 is that they are too entrenched in
"old" policies – principally agriculture – and that structural
funds are made available to any poor region regardless of
the level of income of the country in which they are situated.E
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The UK abatement has lost its justification. Although, the
current proposal of a generalised correction mechanism is
not a panacea, the idea of a "juste retour" does not make
economic sense and should be avoided.
Our main suggestions for reform are that, first, the EU
budget should finance polices that strengthen cohesion,
stimulate competitiveness and give the EU a more effective
voice in the world. Second, the principle for determining
contributions should be the same as that for receipts and it
should be the paying capacity and needs, respectively, of
each Member State. This is a robust and sustainable
foundation for the future budget of the EU. However, it
should be pointed out that it also limits the revenue received
by Member States.
As long as CAP spending is maintained at present levels,
there is little hope that the budget will actually serve as a
stimulant for growth and cohesion. The financing of the EU
will continue to require ad-hoc adjustments that will make
future consensus on budgetary issues more difficult to
achieve. In fact, given the little time left for any extensive
reform, the next FP will not be very different from the present
one. ::
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